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In this interesting paper, Istomin and Dwyer address a the-
oretical debate within anthropology concerning how people
from technologically undeveloped cultures (and, presumably,
the rest of us) orient themselves while navigating. The debate
is cast as a contest between those who advocate a “mental
map” and those who advocate “practical mastery.” The au-
thors are right—this is a poorly framed debate for which the
answer, on empirical and common-sense grounds, is “both.”
Or I suppose you could say it was “neither.” Either way, as
it appears it has been framed in anthropology, this is indeed
a straw-man debate between two positions that are largely
untenable on their own. The practical-mastery theory explains
wayfinding as a sense of “knowing the land” that results from
experience moving through it. But, cartographic maps aside,
how would a person acquire a mental map if not through
experience moving through the landscape? And what would
it mean to “know the land” if not to form representations of
it in the mind? Do proponents of practical mastery think
“knowing” is stored in muscles or bones? The practical-
mastery position is quite reminiscent of the theory of direct
ecological perception expounded by Gibson (1979), whom
the authors cite. Although Gibson—or at least his followers—
offered an alternative to mental maps, I think almost no one
takes direct perception too seriously as a viable model of skills
such as orienting to distant landmarks. (An aside: the authors
write that “[e]ven Gibson . . . never appeared to insist that
his ecological vision was the only basis for explaining spatial
behavior among humans. Certain results of the pointing ex-
periments simply excluded this possibility.” I do not believe
that J. J. Gibson read papers about cognitive maps or pointing
experiments of the kind to which the authors refer, but he
and his followers certainly did believe that ecological theory
was the explanation for spatial behavior. They did allow for
cartographic maps but not cognitive ones.) The important
work by Hutchins (1995) on situated cognition deserves con-
sideration here as well. Hutchins made highly relevant ob-
servations about the situated nature of navigation and ori-
entation, but as with Gibson’s ideas, few people would accept
it as a complete alternative to mental maps.
Questions about the “nonindexical” quality of mental
maps, their dimensionality (1 or 2), their geometric sophis-
tication, and the reference systems used in their organization
and expression in language are interesting and important is-
sues. In fact, they constitute much of the deepest theoretical
debates and fundamental research questions across the dis-
ciplines that study spatial cognition. Researchers in geography
and human psychology generally do not reserve the term
“mental map” or “cognitive map” only for two-dimensional,
nonindexical, metric survey knowledge; a mental map is one’s
internal representation of the environment, whatever its form
and specific content (Downs and Stea 1973). Yes, there is
extensive discussion in the literature about the constructs of
“route maps” and “survey maps,” but both are internal rep-
resentations of the environment that may be referred to met-
aphorically as internal “maps.” Researchers in biology and
animal psychology, in contrast, more or less do reserve the
concept of mental maps for two-dimensional, nonindexical
survey knowledge. Having said this, I doubt that you could
find many proponents of mental maps, including myself, who
would claim that they are fully nonindexical, representing all
of the Earth surface equivalently and allowing access from
any point to any other point with equal speed and accuracy.
So if that’s what you think a mental map is, you are right—
they do not exist.
I agree with the authors that research on cultural variations
is valuable and intriguing, even fascinating, but I wonder how
far ethnographic unstructured interviews and sketch mapping
can go to adjudicate the theoretical issues the authors discuss.
There is no way, for example, to sketch or otherwise make a
map from scratch, whether with sticks, paper, or computers,
except by employing a sequential process. This in no way
proves that the underlying representation is necessarily
routelike. On the other hand, being able to sketch a two-
dimensional configuration does not prove that one has an
underlying survey map. I could turn an internal list of places
along a route into an accurate survey map during the drawing
process, as long as the list included at least approximate in-
formation about metric distances and directions between
some of the places. The ability to accurately sketch maps is
probably needed if one is to make the case for a completely
“nonindexical” survey map, but it in no way suffices to prove
the case.
Thomas Widlok
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This is a most welcome continuation of a discussion that
tackles the intriguing problem of understanding not only hu-
man orientation but also how cognitive processes work more
generally. In my first contribution to this topic I had con-
cluded that “both practice theories and mental-map theories
fail to account for all skilled and habitual forms of orienta-
tion” (Widlok 1997, 328). I am therefore very pleased to see
this conclusion replicated by interdisciplinary research based
on a very different set of empirical data. It is in the framework
of this general appreciation of the work by Istomin and Dwyer
that I offer these critical comments for further thought and
research.
A weak reading of my earlier conclusion was that practice
theory and mental-map theory, each taken by itself, do not
explain orientation. However, this does not necessarily imply
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that we should call it a futile debate, because it is through
this discussion that we were led to make distinctions that
went unnoticed previously. Gell and Ingold highlighted that
different purposes and backgrounds (e.g., that of a mapmaker,
in contrast to a person habitually moving around) also have
to be considered when designing our methods. Ingold’s em-
phasis on practice is strategically important because it is a
corrective to our dominant default model to treat all knowl-
edge as if it was maplike. Finally, Levinson et al.’s work of
different frames of references convinced researchers across
disciplinary boundaries that there is more than one human
frame of reference for orientation available. In the meantime,
we now have not only case studies and positions from the
extremes of the spectrum that initially fired the debate but
also many more “mixed results” that have emerged, for in-
stance, when frames of reference are combined in the way
that one axis is predominantly absolute and the other axis is
relative (see Widlok 2007). What I take Istomin and Dwyer
to mean is that the combination of what appeared to be
exclusive alternatives is probably the normal state of affairs.
But does it follow that we should simply subscribe to both
models? Do humans switch between two modes of cognition
depending on cultural contexts and situations because two of
our models (practice and mental maps) each appear to be
half-true?
There is also a strong reading of my earlier conclusion that
I would like the authors to consider, namely, that both models
fail to account for the orientation skills we are dealing with,
even when they are taken together as a duality. I am not so
much concerned about the general point that an explanation
that is based on a single model is in terms of theory to be
preferred to one based on a duality of models but rather about
unresolved contradictions surrounding the notion of mental
representation in the mental-map model and about the notion
that we are faced with two clearly separable systems (organism
and environment) interacting with one another. I shall refer
to these points in reaction to recent developments in neu-
roscience, another source of information that we as anthro-
pologists need to be able to deal with. These new develop-
ments were succinctly summarized in a recent monograph
(Fuchs 2008) but are reflected also by other attempts to con-
front ecological psychology and phenomenological ap-
proaches with the neurosciences.
Unless we want to assume that cognitive maps are stored
in a completely immaterial and noncorporeal entity called
“culture” (which I suggest we should not, for its obvious
problems) neuroscientists suggest that cognitive maps are
mental representations, nowadays equated with more or less
localized patterns of neural activity. In our case of orientation,
this would mean that a certain pattern of neural activity (the
mental map) is triggered once a certain situational stimulus
is received, for example, crossing the river and getting to the
country where one knows one’s way. Fuchs argues that the
notion of representation (or map) in such a context would
be flawed. While representations always refer to an image of
something for someone, this subjective someone is being
glossed over by most neuroscientists and mental-map mod-
elers. In other words, he argues that environmental infor-
mation is not stored as a representation in the brain, and
mental states are not descriptions of the landscape, but they
only participate in the situations from which corporeal agents
are able to derive the relevant contents (Fuchs 2008, 146).
We, as situated human beings (and not the brain by itself),
generate representations based on implicit and incomplete
knowledge that “only” provides options for acting in a certain
way. And since our particular perspectives as corporeal beings
differ because of our experiences and positions in society,
there is variation to be found within and between groups.
This is not to say that there is no physiological basis for
orientation knowledge; rather, it is not the brain alone that
creates this basis but a larger system of the organism in its
environment. Mental maps therefore do not contain mean-
ingful information, but as patterns of neural activity, they
participate in situations where agents create contents and skill.
It is not about retrieving memory but about providing “open
loops” for experience in the sense of a readiness to act in
anticipation of certain situations (like having crossed a certain
river).
As long as the implicit or explicit notion of the mental
map is as problematic as that of “retrieving” representational
contents from the brain, anthropologists should continue
looking for a better model to explain orientation.
Reply
We wish to thank the numerous reviewers for providing,
throughout the publication process, suggestions and com-
ments that we generally found very useful, insightful, and at
times, challenging.
Aporta has four main issues with our paper. First, he dis-
agrees that route-based spatial cognition and mental maps do
not conflict, which, therefore, implies that human spatial ori-
entation can be based strictly on either visual memorization
of routes or mental maps. He opts for route-based spatial
cognition, which despite not “necessar(il)y contesting the ex-
istence of mental maps,” leaves us wondering about the mys-
terious process and conditions under which humans would
select one method rather than the other?
Second, according to Aporta, our understanding of Ingold’s
ideas is “limited and . . . misleading,” since Ingold “never
actually states that humans are incapable of spatial abstrac-
tion.” To address this comment, we first need to quote a
section of Ingold’s work.
“For the map-using stranger, making his way in unfamiliar
country, ‘being here’ or ‘going there’ generally entails the
ability to identify one’s current or intended future position
with a certain spatial or geographic location, defined by the
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